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AN OKLAHOMA PERSPECTIVE: END OF LIFE
DECISION-MAKING AND TERMINATION OF
TREATMENT
Teresa Meinders Burkett & Samantha Weyrauch
Death is one of the few certainties in life and is one of the most difficult topics
to discuss. Attorneys are in a unique position to raise this topic with their clients and
impress upon them the advantages of discussing end of life issues with their families
while they are capable of doing so. By utilizing various combinations of legal
documents, an attorney can help a client document their decisions to ensure that their
end of life directions are carried out.
Numerous state and federal laws govern patients and physicians in end-of-life
decision-making as well as the use of pain control medication which often is
prescribed for seriously ill or injured individuals. Those of greatest significance
include the state laws governing: (1) Advance Directives for Health Care; (2) DNR
Orders and (3) Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care. This article examines
these three issues from an Oklahoma perspective with a particular focus on treatment
decisions before the end of life.

I. ADVANCE DiREcTivEs FOR HEALTH CARE
A. The Oklahoma Rights of the Terminally Ill or Persistently UnconsciousAct
The Oklahoma Rights of the Terminally Ill or Persistently Unconscious Act
gives legal effect to the document popularly known as a "living will."' This
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document, called the Advance Directive for Health Care, becomes effective after a

physician determines that a patient is suffering from a terminal condition or is
2
persistently unconsciousness.
The Advance Directive for Health Care is composed of three major parts: (1)
the "Living Will," in which an individual advises the physician regarding treatment
decisions; (2) the "Health Care Proxy," in which an individual appoints a surrogate
decision-maker to communicate with physicians; and (3) the "Anatomical Gifts"

section which expresses the individual's wishes regarding organ donation.3
The Rights Act allows a competent adult to sign an Advance Directive for
Health Care instructing that life-sustaining procedures be withheld or withdrawn in
the event the adult develops "a terminal condition" or becomes "persistently
unconscious."4 This document permits the individual to reject artificial nutrition and

hydration under the same circumstances.5 Finally, the individual may direct other

6
treatment to be given or withheld, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).
The Oklahoma form and content of the Advance Directive for Health Care is
provided by statute and must be substantially followed.7 It must be signed by two
witnesses who are not related to the declarant8 but does not require a Notary Public.9
The Advance Directive becomes part of the patient's medical record, until revoked,

1. OK.A. STAT. tit. 63 § 3101.1-.16(West 1997 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter Rights Act]. See Cruzan v. Director
497 U.S. 261,323 n. 21 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (despite the great deal of discussion of living wills, "[slurveys
show that the overwhelming majority of Americans have not executed such written instructions"); BARRY FURROW,
Biom-mcs: HEALTH CARE LAW AnD ETmCS 254-258 (West Group, 3d ed. 1997) (providing a historical discussion of
living wills and the structure of the respective statutes)[hereinafter FURROW]; see generallyGregory Gelfand, Living
Will Statutes: The FirstDecade, 1987 WIs. L. REv. 737 (1987) (providing a broad view of the history and scope of
living will statutes); Leslie P. Francis, The Evanescenceof Living Wills, 14 J. CoNrmmp. L. 27 (1988) (discussing
useful perspectives on the value of living wills).
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 3101.4 (West 1997 &Supp. 2000); SeeALANMmism, asmRiGrToDia5 (John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. (2d ed. 1989). "The hallmark of advanced directives is that they are a form of anticipatory medical
decisionmaking." Id. This is in contrast to ordinary medical processes that is contemporaneous. Id. See generally
Schneiderman et al., Effects of OfferingAdvace Directiveson Medical Treatmentand Costs, 117 ANNALS IERNAL
MED. 599 (1992), for a discussion on the question on whether it costs less to treat a patient who is near death who have
advance directive compared to those individuals who do not. But see J. Teno et al., Do Advance DirectivesProvide
InstructionsthatDirectCare,J.ANL.GEiamucSOC'Y508 (1997) (discussing the notion that advance directives were
helpful in naming a proxy but not in providing directions about care).
3. OK.A. STAT .tit. 63, § 3101.4 (3) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000). See generally MEisaEL, supranote 2, at 6-7
(providing an in depth discussion of the three general and interrelated purposes of an advance directive). The three
purposes of an advanced directive are the following: (1) provide a means of exercising some degree of control over
medical care even if they lack capacity to do so at the time that treatment decisions need to be made; (2) avoid some
of the more serious procedural problems associated with making decisions for patients who lack decisonmaking
capacity; and (3) provide health care providers from civil and criminal liability. Id. See, e.g., Loren Roth et al., Tests
of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 279 (1977) (describing a frequently cited test to
determine competency for medical decisionmaking).
4. OKLA.STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.A(B) (West 1997 &Supp. 2000). An advance directive maybeissuedby a person
who is in good or poor health, but must be issued by one who possesses medical decisionmaking capacity. MISE3,
supranote 2, at 5. See generally MaIsE., supranote 2, at 54-56 (discussing the enforcement of advance directives in
medical emergencies).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.4(B) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
6. See id.
7. SeeMi.
8. See MSaisa., supranote 2, at 13 (stating that an individual who issues a living will is frequently referred to in
advance directive statutes as a declarant, and the advance directive is sometimes referred to as a declaration),
9. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101A(B)(West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
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and provides effective documentation of a patient's decision not to be placed on life
support or receive artificial nutrition and hydration."0 The Rights Act provides that
a physician or hospital which withholds treatment in compliance with the directive

cannot be held civilly or criminally liable unless they are otherwise negligent."
B. The Hydrationand Nutritionfor the Incompetents Act
The Advance Directive for Health Care provides a section for a patient to
withdraw hydration and nutrition under certain circumstances. 2 Further, Oklahoma
has also enacted the Hydration and Nutrition for Incompetents Act 3 which prohibits
the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition from any patient in order to hasten death
unless one of the following enumerated conditions are met:
A patient with a terminal condition or who is persistently unconscious,
(1)
whencompetent, gave informed consent for hydration and nutrition to14be withheld.
This may be documented in an Advance Directive for Health Care.

10. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.4 (C) (West 1997 & Supp, 2000)
11. See id. § 3 101. 10 (West 1997 &S upp.2000);see MEsELsupranote 2, at 37-38 (discussing in depth immunity
and non-conforming advance directives). It is possible that there is little or no difference in immunity when it is made
on the basis of a statutory directive, a non-conforming directive, or no directive at all because the courts have held that
the health care professions who comply with the decisions of surrogates in the absence of any directive are also
presumed to be immune from liability. Id. at 37. See also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludsworth, 452
So.2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984) (holding that to be relieved of civil and criminal liability, guardians, consenting family
members, physicians, hospitals, or their administrators need only act ingoodfaith); Degreila v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698,
710 (1993) (specifically addressing the issue ofphysician liability in a case where all the necessary facts are established
and carefully documented by the parties involved).
12. A significant number of statutes, including Oklahoma, explicitly prohibit the withholding or withdrawal of
artificial nutrition or hydration: COLO. REV. SaAT. § 15-14-506(l) (1999); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19A-571(a)
(1999)(must be provided unless th patient is in terminal condition); HAXV. REV. STAT. § 551d-2.5(c) (1999) (if such
authority is explicitly stated in health acre power of attorney); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (1999); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-702(c) (vest 1999)(may be withheld or withdrawn unless optional provision regarding principal's
desire to receive artificial nutrition and hydration is signed); MD. CODE ANN., HEALH GEN. II § 5-603(Il)(A)(2)(D)
(1999); MiN.STAT.ANN. § 145c.04(l) (West 1999), MiN. STAT.ANN. § 145B.03(2)(B)(2) (West 1999)(if declaration
states declarant's preferences regarding artificial administration of nutrition and hydration); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
404.820.1 (Vest 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3418(2) (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.830.6 (Michie 19999 )
(if principal had expressly requested attending physician not to withhold or withdraw in power of attorney document);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-:3(m) (1999); N.Y. PuB. HEALTHLAW § 2982(2)(B) Gould, McKinney or Consol. 1999);
OHto REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(C), (E) (Anderson or West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.4(B) (West
1999) (under "Hydration andNutrition for Incompetent Patients Act,"OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3081-0.1-.5 (West
1997 & Supp. 2000) (nutrition and hydration may be withheld or withdrawn if specifically authorized by a living will
or health care power of attorney executed pursuant to a statute); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.540(6), (7) (1999); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 5414(a) (West 1999) (nutrition and hydration must be provided to apregnantwoman who is incompetent
and has a termination condition or is permanently unconscious); S.D. CoDIFmD LAws § 59-7-2.7 (Michie 1999) (may
not be withheld or withdrawn if needed for comfort care or relief of pain, or if it can be physically assimilated by
principal, or if its benefits of providing artificial nutrition and hydration outweigh its burdens, or ifthere is no clear and
convincing evidence that artificial nutrition and hydration was refused by the principal prior to loss of decisional
capacity);UTAHCoDEANN. § 75-2-1106 (1999);W.VA.CODE§ 16-30A-4(D)(6) (1999);Wls.STAT.ANN.§ 155.20(4)
(West 1999) (may consent to withholding or withdrawal or non-orally ingested nutrition or hydration if authorized to
do so by instrument). See also MEmsn., supranote 2, at 174 (commenting that the controversy over the propriety of
forgoing artificial nutrition and hydration is reflected in the large number of health care power of attorney statutes that
have provisions dealing with this matter).
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3080.1- § 3080.5 (,Vest 1997 & Supp. 2000)
14. A proxy is permitted to authorize the withholding or withdrawing of artificial nutrition and hydration only if
the principal has specifically refused it. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101A03) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000), OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3080.4(A)(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (if provision regarding withdrawal or artificially
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(2)
Two physicians concur in writing that artificially administered nutrition
or hydration is medically impossible or would cause intractable pain, or
(3)
Two physicians agree that an incompetent patient is in the end stage of a
terminal condition and death is imminent and would occur as a result of the disease
or injury rather than as a result of the withholding of hydration and nutrition. 5
A patient is most assured that his or her wishes regarding artificial nutrition and

hydration will be honored if the patient's decision is set forth in an Advance Directive
for Health Care.16 However, an Advance Directive becomes operable only if a patient
is terminally ill or persistently unconscious. 7 Significantly, those individuals
suffering from dementia, pneumonia, or another debilitating condition that is not
necessarily terminal will almost certainly be tube-fed if their health care providers

comply with this law. 8
C.

The FederalPatientSelf-DeterminationAct

In 1990, the United Stated Supreme Court heard its first right-to-die case in
Cruzan v. Directors.9 This landmark case provided an impetus for individuals to
draft advance directives in the event that the state in which they live might come to
require them. Shortly after Cruzan, Congress enacted the Patient Self-Determination
Act, giving further impetus for advance directives.2
administered nutrition and hydration is not signed by declarant, artificial nutrition and hydration will be provided).
15. OKLa. STAT. tit. 63, § 3080.4 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000). See FuRRow, supranote 1, at 278-280 (discussing
the issue of medical futility and defining the American Medical Associations determinations on the subject); Daniel
Callahan, MedicalFutility,Medical Necessity: The Problem-Without-A-Name, HASTINGS CENnTR REP., July-Aug.
1991, ; Judith Daar, Medical Futility and Implicationsfor PhysicianAutonomy, 21 AM. J. L. &MED. 221 (1995).
16. SeegenerallyRobertSteinbrook etal.,ArtifcialFeedng-SolidGround,NotaSlipperySlope, 318 NE ENG.
J. MED. 286 (1988) (describing "the emerging consensus" that "artificial feeding can be viewed on a level with other
medical interventions- cardiopulmonary resuscitation, mechanical ventilation, dialysis, antibiotic therapy").
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101-5 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
18. See generally Masa, supra note 2, at 592-603, for a detailed discussion on the number of interrelated
arguments that are given for distinguishing artificial nutrition and hydration from other life-sustaining medical
treatments.
19. Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Notably, the United States Supreme Court had no guidance on any
right-to-dieissue by any federal appellate court. The Supreme Court had previously denied certiorari in few right-to-die
cases. See Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied,488 U.S. 958, reh'g denied,488
U.S. 1024 (1989); In re estate ofPrange, 520 N.E.2d 946 (111. App. Ct.), vacated, 527 N.E.2d 303 (Ill.), cert. denied
sub nom. Murphy v. Benson, 488 U.S. 892 (1988); In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434 (NJ.), reconsideration and stay denied,
531 A.2d 1360 (NJ.), cert. deniedsub nom. Lincoln Park Nursing & Convalescent Home v. Kahn, 483 U.S. 1036
(1987); In re Quinlan,355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981); William H. Colby, MissouriStandsAlone, HAsTnGs CENTERREP., SepL-Oct. 1990, at 5 (written by council
for the Cruzans); John A. Robertson, Cruzan: No Rights Violated, Sept-Oct 1990, at 8.
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ce(f) (1999). See OminibusBudget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 101508, §§ 4206,4751, 104 Stat. 1388-115 tp-117, 1388-204 to-206 (codifed at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 cc (f(1) & §
1396a(a)(West Supp. 2000) (containing provisions imposing responsibilities on institutional health care providers with
respect to advance directives that grew out of the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1989); FURRow, supra note 1, at
263-265 (discussing the Patient Self-Determination Act in general).
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The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) requires, as a condition of
participation in Medicare and/or Medicaid programs, that certain institutional health
care providers (hospitals, nursing homes, hospices and home health agencies) furnish
patients with information about advance directives at the time of admission.' The
central right that this legislation creates is the right of the
patients to be provided with specific information.22 Managed care companies are
required to make this request each time an individual enrolls in a managed care plan.'
With regard to hospitals, the request must be made of inpatients only.24 Providers
must also advise patients or enrollees of their right to consent to or decline health care
options according to both current law and that provider's own policiesY2

If a patient indicates that he or she has signed an Advance Directive, it must be
made part of the patient's medical record.26 If a patient has not signed such a
document, there is no requirement that an Advance Directive form be provided to the

patient.27 The Act does not prescribe a federal format for an Advance Directive.
Each state has its own laws and form for completing an Advance Directive.28

II. THE OKLAHOMA Do-NOT-RESUSCITATE ACT AND DO-NOT-RESUSCIrATE
ORDERS

In 1997, the Oklahoma Legislature passed the state's first statutory provisions
governing the use of Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) Orders in 1997.29 A DNR Order is
one of the primary means to convey the decision to avoid extraordinary measures to

21. 42 U.S.C. A.§ 1395cc(f(1) (1999).See MEISEL supranote 2, at 14 (stating that the validilty and enforceability
of advance directives is gradually shifting to the question of validity of advance directives not drafted in conformance
vith a living will or health care power of attorney statute).
22. MEISEL, supra note 2 at 51. The content of the information is governed by state law and bythe policies of
particular health care organizations. Id. at 51-52.
23. Id.
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f)(2)(A) (1999).

25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f)(l)(A) (1999).
26. OKLA. STAT. tit.63, § 3104A(C) (vest 1997 & Supp. 2000).
27. See Gianelli,Many Say DoctorsAren'tLiving Up to Expectationsof Living Will Law, AM. MED. NEVs, May
17, 1993, at l(some report that the PSDA has not had the effect of encouraging physicians to initiate end-of-life
discussions with patients); LoewyAdvance DirectivesandSurrogateLaws: EthicalInstruments orMoralCop-out,
152 ARCHIVEs INTERNALMED. 1973 (1992) (documenting thatthere has been concern that the PSDA is motivated more
by not having to trouble themselves in making critical and agonizing decisions rather than genuine respect for actual
informed choice of the patient).
28. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.4(B) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (exemplifying the Advance Directive form
that must be completed). See also Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.Rptr. 484,489 (Ct. App. 1983) ("The lack of
generalized public awareness of the statutory scheme and the typically human characteristics of procrastination and
reluctance to contemplate the need for such arrangements however makes this a tool which will all to often go unused
by those who might desire it"); MEISEL, supranote 3, at 14 (commenting thatthe insistence on using and enforcing only
advance directives that strictly comply with state statutes can seriously frustrate the wishes of declarants and pose
significant barriers to patients that have not executed an advanced directive or heath care power of attorney).
29. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.1 (WestSupp. 2000) [hereinafter DNR Act]. See MEISEL, supranote 2, at 555
("DNR statutes do not echo one well-accepted scheme, but rather embody diverse and sometimes disjointed
provisions").
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prolong life." The order is written by a physician in an individual's medical record
to indicate that the individual should not receive cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the
event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest.3 1 The DNR Act not only regulates the

circumstances under which DNR Orders may be written, but also makes such orders
transferable between different health care facilities.
Before passage of the DNR Act, whether or not a DNR Order was written for

a particular patient was primarily a medical decision made by a patient's physicians
in consultation with the patient or, if the patient was not competent, the patient's
family members. CPR was originally developed to resuscitate otherwise healthy
32
individuals who suffered an unexpected cardiac or respiratory arrest.

Ordinarily, a person who suffers an arrest will be resuscitated through CPR
unless it is not medically appropriate to do so. 3 CPR is generally considered
medically appropriate for an individual whose death is not imminent. In contrast, if
an individual is in the final stages of an illness or is so seriously injured that death is

expected to occur, many would consider resuscitation futile given the patient's
underlying medical condition.' While CPR is beneficial for healthy people who
suffer an unexpected arrest, it has crept into common use for every person who dies,
including those who are terminally ill or have little hope of survival.
A. CircumstancesIn Which A DNR OrderMay Be Written

Until passage of the Oklahoma Do-Not-Resuscitate Act, the decision of whether
CPR should be administered in a particular instance was based primarily on the

physician's professional judgment as to whether the intervention would be medically

30. Such an order is generally referred to as a do-not-resuscitate order (DNR order), an order not to resuscitate, or
a no-code order. E.g., C.A.. v. Morgan, 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1175 (M.App. Ct. 1992) (do not resuscitate means do not
give cardiac compression or intubation); Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 830bP.2d 1185, 1187 (Idaho
1992) ("no code"); Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Ct.App. 1992) ("No Code Blue);
Belcher v. Charston Area Medical Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827,830 (W. Va. 1992) (DNR order also known as a "no 1-2-3
order").'
31. See MEISEt, supra note 2, at 543 (explaining that DNR orders are frequently written in clinical practice, and
courts have also authorized the withholding of CPR when confronted with the issue). See generally Sullivan, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17,1982, atB-13 (documenting a time when withholding CPR was considered so controversial thatDNR
orders were often notwritten or discussed leading to procedures in at least one hospital that a grandjury described them
as "shocking procedural abuses").
32. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.3(2) (West Supp. 2000). See also Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp.,
728 A.2d 166,177 n.13 (Md. 1999) "The Attorney General defines cardiac arrest as "'the sudden unexpected cessation
ofheartbeat cessation ofheartbeat and blood pressure. It leads to loss ofconsciousness within seconds, irreversible brain
damage in as little as 3 minutes, and death within 4 to 15 minutes."'.
33. See, e.g., InreDinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134,135-136 (Mass.App. Ct. 1978) (citingHouts&Houts, Courtroom
Medicine Series: Death § 1.01(3)(d)(1976)). [m]any of these procedures are...highly intrusive, and some are violent
in nature. The defibrillator, for example, causes violent (and painful) muscle contractions which, in a patient suffering
(as the patient is) from osteoporosis, may cause fracture of vertebrae or other bones. Such fractures in turn,
cause pain, which may be extreme. Id.
34. OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 63, § 3131 A(C)(2) (West Supp. 2000) (resuscitation"will not prevent the imminent death
of thepatient"). E.g.,GA.CODEANN. § 31-39-2(4) (Harrision orMichie 19991;N.Y.PuBu1cHEaLTmLAw § 2965(3)(c)
(McKinney, Colsol. or Gould 1999) (surrogate may consent to DNR order if CPR futile); WASH. REV. CoDn ANN. §
43.70A80 (West 1999) (if a person executed directive requesting withholding futile emergency medical treatment).
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appropriate considering the patient's condition and expressed desires." Under current
law, DNR Orders are governed by state-prescribed procedures and, although the
provisions are not mandatory, no physician or health care facility may legally take
any action that will conflict with the new Act. 6
In regulating the issuance of DNR Orders, the DNR Act creates a presumption
that every person consents to the administration of CPR unless one of six situations
exists:
(1)
The patient has advised his attending physician that he does not consent
to CPR and this is noted in the patient's medical records37 ;
(2)
The parent or guardian of a minor child, after consulting with the child's
physician, has notified the child's physician that the parent or guardian does not
consent to CPR and, if the child is old enough to understand the consequences of
this decision, does not object to the decision (and the decision does not violate
federal laws prohibiting withholding of treatment from disabled infants)38 ;
(3)
An incapacitatedpatient's legally appointed representative has notified the
patient's attending physician that the patient does not consent to CPR and this is
noted in the patient's medical records;
(4)
An attending physician of an incapacitated patient without a "representative" knows by clear and convincing evidence that the patient, when competent,
decided based on sufficient information to constitute informed consent that he
would not consent to CPR and the physician then signs a statutory form entitled
"Certificate of Physician" before placing a DNR Order in the chart;

35. See Masa, supranote 2, at 555, stating that it can be difficult to deternine rapidly whether or not the patient
had previously authorized the forgoing of CPR because the procedure is normally administered under emergency
situations.
36. See the following DNR statutes for detail in what is required for a legally binding DNR Order.ALAsKA STAT.
§§ 18.12.035-.100 (Michie 1999); ARIZ.REv.STAT.ANN. § 36-3251 (West 1999); ARK. CODEANN. §§ 20-13-901 to
-908 (Michie 1999); CAL HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1569.74 (Deering 1999), CALPROB. CODE § 4753 (Deering
1999); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18.6-101 to -108 (1999); CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1999a-580d (West 1999); FLA.
STAT.ANN. § 401.45(3) (vest 1999); GA.CoDEANN. §§ 31-39-1 to -9 (Harrison 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-229.5
(1999);IDAHOCODE §§ 39-151 to -165 (1999); 210 ILL COMiP.STAT.ANN. 45/2-104.2 (West 1999);IND. CODEANN.
§ 16-36-5 (vest or Michie 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4941 to -4948 (1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:
1299.58.2, .58.3, &.58.7-10 (West 1999); MD. CODEANN.,HEALTHGEN. I § 5-608 (1999);McH. COMP. LAWSANN.
§§ 333.1051-.1067 (West 1999); MoNT.CODEANN.§§ 50-10-101 to-107 (1999); NEv.REV.STAT.ANN. §§ 450b.400590 (Michie 1999);NJ.STAT.ANN. § 26:2h-68 (West 1999); N.M.STAT.ANN. § 24-10b-4(j) (Michie 1999); N.Y.PtrB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2979 (Mckinney, Consol. Or Gould 1999); OHIO REV. CODE AN. § 2133.02 (West 1999);
OKA.STAT. ANN.Tit 63, §§ 3131.1-.14 (West 199997 & Supp. 2000); PA. CNs. STAT. ANN. Tit. 20, § 5413 (vest
1999); RI. GEN LAWS § 23-4.10-4, §23-4.11-14 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-78-10 to -65 (Law. Co-op. 1999);
TENN.CODEANN. § 68-11-224, §§ 68-140-601 to -604 (1999); TEx.HEAiTH&SAFENCoDEANN. §§ 674.001-.024
(West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1105.5 (1999); VA. CODE Am. §§ 54.1-2982, -2987.1, -2901, 63.1-174.3
(Michie 1999); WASH.REv.CODEANN. § 43.70.480 (vest 1999); W.VA.CODE §§ 16-30c-1 to-16 (1999); WIS.STAT.
ANN. §§ 154.17-.29 (West 1999); Wvyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-22-201 to -208 (Michie 1999).
37. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 313 1.4(B)(2)(b) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring a physician to note in the medical
record when an explanation has been made to the representative and family member of the nature and consequences of
the decision to be made);MEIEL, supra note 2, at 547-555 (providing an extensive discussion on informed consent
orders and the case law surrounding the issue).
38. See infra notes 46,47.
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(5)
The patient or his legally appointed representative has signed a form
prescribed by statute to consent to a DNR Order; or
(6)
The patient has signed an Advance Directive for Health Care expressly
directing that life-sustaining treatment not be performed in the event of a cardiac
or respiratory arrest.
The Act leaves open to interpretation whether this presumption of consent to
CPR would require CPR to be performed absent one of the six specified circumstances. Nevertheless, the Act presumes that even those terminally ill patients who
have little or no chance of survival want to receive CPR, even if its provision would
provide no benefit and possibly cause additional suffering.39
B. ImportantStatutory Definitions Related to the DNR Act
Certain definitions in the DNR Act are crucial to an understanding of the six
statutory conditions by which the presumption of consent to CPR may be rebutted.
First, a "representative" who can communicate a patient's wishes to the patient's
physician omits any reference to family members.40 Rather, under the Act, a
"representative" is limited to a legally appointed guardian, an attorney-in-fact for
health care decisions named in a durable power of attorney, or a health care proxy
named in the patient's Advance Directive for Health Care." Contrary to the
traditional practice before the DNR Act was passed, the physician can only act on a
communication with the patient's family under strictly prescribed legalistic
circumstances.
As noted above, if an incapacitated patient has not appointed a legal "representative," the presumption that the patient desires CPR remains unless the physician
determines that there is "clear and convincing evidence that the incapacitated person,
when competent, decided on information sufficient to constitute informed consent that
such person would not have consented to the administration of [CPR] in the event of
cardiac or pulmonary arrest."42 According to the Act, this evidence may include
"communication between the patient and . . . others close to the patient with
knowledge of the patient's personal desires."43 The difficulty this language presents
for physicians is that it may be almost impossible to determine with any degree of
confidence whether this standard has been met.

39. See Leslie J. Blackhall, Must We Alvays Use CPR?, 317 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1281 (1987) (analyses cases in
which CPR would be inappropriate); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
GuidelinesfortheAppropriate
Use ofDNR Orders,265 JAMA 1868 (1991); Stuart J.Younger, Do-Not-Resuscitate
Orders:No Longer Secret But Still a Problem, 17 HASmINGS CEmmE REP., Feb. 1987, at 24. See also infra note 15,
40. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.3 (D) (West Supp. 2000). See FuRRow, supra note 1, at 264-265 (discussing
physician deference to family members concerning an incompetent patient)
41. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.3 (10) (West Supp. 2000).
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131A(4) (West Supp. 2000).
43. Id.
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"Clear and convincing evidence" is a legal standard of proof which lies between
(1) the most common civil standard of "preponderance of the evidence," meaning the
evidence indicates a matter is more likely true than not or the decision maker is just
slightly more convinced of the truth of an assertion than not, and (2) the criminal law
standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," meaning the person asked to decide
has no reasonable way to reach a different conclusion as to the truth of an assertion.'
Further, the "clear and convincing evidence" standard is not a symmetrical one; it
applies to an individual seeking to terminate life sustaining treatment, but not to an
individual seeking to maintain it."
The "clear and convincing" standard of proof requires a "firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of an assertion" according case law. 6 "Firm belief or
conviction" is an imprecise description of the level of confidence a physician must
have in the information a patient's family or friend provides as to the patient's wishes.
This standard requires something more than a simple belief that the family members'
report of the patient's wishes is true, but something less than absolute certainty that
the report is accurate.
Under the "clear and convincing" standard, the Act requires the physician to
have a "firm belief or conviction" that the patient was competent when the communication of his wishes was made and that, before stating those wishes, the patient had
sufficient information to give what amounted to informed consent concerning his
stated choice regarding CPR. This heightened level of certainty the physician must
have concerning the patient's choice is further complicated by the subjective standard
for informed consent recognized in Oklahoma. The physician must determine that the
patient had sufficient information that would be important to that particular patient
to make an informed choice as opposed to merely having sufficient information for
a reasonable person to make a decision. The subtle difference between the objective
standard applied in most states and the subjective standard for informed consent
required in Oklahoma may not be appreciated by many physicians.
If a physician were merely making a notation in an incompetent patient's record
concerning reported information about a patient's wishes regarding CPR, this
requirement may not be so troublesome. However, the DNR Act requires a physician
to sign a "Certificate of Physician" to be placed in the medical record certifying the
physician's belief that clear and convincing evidence exists of the patient's informed

44. Cruzan v. Directors, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that "a state may apply a clear and convincing evidence
standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration ofa person diagnosed to be in
a persistent vegetative state"). See FURROW, supranote 1, at 288 (stating that most states have adopted the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard in right to die cases, although what that evidentiary standard means varies from state
to state); see generallyIn re Eichner, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (N.Y.1981) (discussing the appropriate burden of proof raised
before the New York Court of Appeals); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 405 (Mich. 1995)_(holding that the clear and
convincing standard is not in itself a substantive standard for the removal of life sustaining treatment).
45. FURRoW,supra note 1, at 289. The application of this evidentiary standard serves to recognize a policy that
it is better to err on the side of maintaining life rather than terminating it. ld.
46. See MEISEL, supranote 2, at43 (describing the difference in what constitutes "clear and convincing evidence"
among the states). "In some states, it is clear and convincing evidence that the patient would have decided to forgo
treatment-in effect, clear and convincing evidence of the substituted judgement standard. Id. In other states, it is clear
and convincing evidence that it is not in the patient's best interests, as determined by the family and the doctor, that the
treatment be continued.' Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 35 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 6

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:565

decision to refuse CPR and that the decision was made while the patient was
competent. 47 Physicians should exercise great caution before entering such a
certification in the patient's record.48
Finally, the DNR Act does not define the term "every person" as it is used in the

Act. Presumably, "every person" would be limited to persons who are legally capable
of giving consent to medical care. However, unlike other laws concerning end of life

decision making, this Act does not specify that the individual who may sign the DNR
Consent Form must be 18 years of age or older.49 Until this issue is clarified, only
individuals who are capable of giving informed consent to medical care should be
permitted to sign these statutory DNR Consent Forms.5"
C. Recent Amendments to the DNR Act

Numerous amendments to the DNR Act were passed in the last legislative
session becoming effective November 1, 1999. The changes include the following:

"Health care agencies," including hospitals, physician's offices, nursing homes,
clinics, homehealth agencies and hospices, must draft written policies and procedures
with respect to the use of DNR Orders, DNR consent forms, and Certificates of
Physicians. The policies must reflect that DNR decisions must be made by the
patient unless a patient's statutorily-defined "Representative" is required to

communicate such decisions in light of the patient's incapacity. The patient's
incapacity must be documented in the medical record before relying on the patient's
51
Representative.
A physician cannot rely on the patient's Representative's consent until the
physician provides a written instruction concerning the patient's condition to the

patient's Representative and that Representative provides a written statement to the
physician that the Representative "is deciding what the incapacitated person would

have wanted if the incapacitated person could speak for himself or herself."
Physicians are to encourage "consultation" among all family members,

47. OKLA. STAT. tiL 63, § 3131.4(B)(2)(b) (,Vest Supp. 2000).
48. See David H. Miller, Right-to-DieDamageActions: Developments in the Law, DEN. U.LREV. 181 (1988)
(describing the host of causes of action that could be filed against a health care provider who improperly fails to
discontinue life sustaining treatment including: ordinary medical malpractice, informed consent, battery, negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil rights actions).
49. OKA STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.4(2) (West Supp.2000). In situations where the minor is clearly not capable of
consent, the statute specifically provides for parental consent to a DNR order for the child. Id. But see MEIsEL, supra
note 2, at 563 (commenting that these types ofprovisions are not necessary because parents have the authority to forgo
life-sustaining treatment on behalfof theirchildren in the firstplace); see generallyLisa Hawkins, Living WillStatutes:
A Minor Oversight,78 VA. L. R. 1581 (1992) (discussing the ways in which children could be included in advance
directive legislation).
50. Some statutes provide that aminoris authorized to consent to a DNR order ifthe attending physician determines
that the minor has adequate decisionmaking capacity or that a minor's consent is needed in addition to the consent of
the parents. E.g., GA. CODEANN. § 31-49-4(d) (check to see ifMichie or Harrision 1999) (if attending physician thinks
a minor sufficiently mature, DNR order not valid without minor's consent); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2967(2)(a)
(MeKinney, Consol. Or Gould 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.4(2) (Vest 1999); W. VA. CODE § 16-30C-6(d)
(1999) (if attending physician believes minor between the ages of 16 and 18 to be sufficiently mature, order not valid
without minor's consent; minor wishes prevail in case of conflict between minor and parents).
51. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.4 (West Supp. 2000).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol35/iss3/6

10

Burkett and Weyrauch: An Oklahoma Perspective: End of Life Decision-Making and Terminat

2000]

END OFLIFE DECISION-MAKING

Representatives and others close to the incapacitated person, to the extent feasible.
There is no description as to the form this "consultation" is to take. However, the fact
that a "consultation" among these individuals was encouraged by the physician should
be documented in the patient's record.5 2
Physicians must explain the nature and consequences of the decision to be made
concerning a DNR Order to the Representative and family members. The fact that
this explanation was provided must also be documented in the medical record.
Family members still cannot make a DNR consent decision for the patient, but can
communicate statements made by the patient while competent concerning the patient's
wishes in this regard.
"Health care agencies" must provide "ongoing education" to patients, staff and
the community regarding the DNR Consent Form.53
No physician or other health care provider is required to perform CPR "when,
in reasonable medical judgment, it would not prevent the imminent death of the
patient." This means that CPR does not need to be provided in cases of medical
futility. It is important that medical futility be documented in the patient's medical
record by stating that "in this physician's reasonable medical judgment, CPR would
not prevent the imminent death of this patient." This language in the patient's record
will support a decision to withhold CPR, but will not support a written DNR Order
unless otherwise authorized by the Act (patient consent, legal representative consent,
physician certification, parent consent for minor child). This change may represent
the most significant departure from current practice: the permissible withholding of
CPR without a DNR Order.
D. Facility PoliciesRegardingDNR Orders
An early version of the Act would have permitted health care facilities to
continue to follow their own policies regarding DNR Orders without violating the new
Act. Thoseprovisions were subsequently modified to require any DNR Orders issued
to comply with a facility's policies so long as those policies do not conflict with the
new Act. Thus, hospitals and other facilities will need to review their current DNR
policies to make sure they conform to the new law.54 In addition, the information
given to patients concerning their rights under state law as required by the federal
Patient Self-Determination Act must be updated to describe these latest statutory
additions. There is no requirement that the Oklahoma DNR Consent Form set forth
in the Act be made available to patients at health care facilities.
E. Use of the DNR Consent Form
The statutorily prescribed form to consent to a DNR Order does not contain any

52. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131A(B)(2)(b) (West Supp. 2000).
53. OKL.a. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.3 (West Supp. 2000).
54. Okq.A. STAT. tit. 63, § 31314(B) (West Supp. 2000) Health care agencies are required to maintain written
policies and procedures with respect to do-not-resuscitate orders, do-not-resuscitate consent forms, and certification of
physicians. Id.
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language that would limit its use to situations in which CPR is not medically
appropriate.55 For that reason, it is probably inadvisable for individuals to sign such
a form unless they are in the end stages of a terminal illness and there is no question
that CPR should not be administered. Otherwise, CPR may be prematurely withheld
under circumstances the patient may not have anticipated when the form was signed.
As an alternative to signing the statutory form before being diagnosed as
terminally ill, an individual may be better advised to add a statement to his Advance
Directive for Health Care that, should his physicians determine that CPR would not
be medically appropriate, that he consents to the entry of a DNR Order.56 This would
comply with the sixth statutorily enumerated situation in which CPR consent is no
longer presumed. It also would reinsert the concept of medical appropriateness for
CPR into the physician's decision-making, and at the same time, prevent a legal
"representative" from revoking the patient's DNR consent contrary to the patient's
wishes.
While strictly limiting a representative's authority to consent to a DNR Order,
the DNR Act grants liberal authority to the representative to cancel a DNR Order,
even when such action is contrary to thepatient's stated wishes. A representative may
revoke the DNR consent of an incapacitated person at any time. Moreover, without
regard to medical necessity, the physician must "immediately cancel" a DNR Order
whenever advised of such a revocation. As a result, a representative would have the
power to require a full resuscitative effort without regard to the patient's wishes or
medical condition. Including one's directions concerning CPR in an Advanced
Directive rather than in the DNR Consent Form will protect against such an action.
F.

Recommendationsfor Physicians

In order to comply with the Act, when writing a DNR Order, physicians
should take the following steps:
1. Document a DNR Order when a competent patient consents - this may be done
verbally and then recorded in the chart. Use of the DNR Consent form is optional.
2. Document a DNR Order when an incapacitated patient's guardian, health care
proxy or attorney-in-fact who holds a valid durable power of attorney for health care
consents. Use of the DNR Consent form is optional. Consent must be documented
in the chart.
3.
When relying on consent to a DNR Order by a Representative, document the
following in the patient's medical record:
that written instruction was given to the Representative by the physician
concerning the effect of a DNR Order and that the Representative gave written
instruction to the physician that the incapacitated person would have consented to the
DNR Order. The Representative's instruction should be placed in the record.
that "consultation" among family members and the Representative was

55. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.5(B) (West Supp. 2000).
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101A(B) (West Supp. 2000).
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encouraged.
the reason the Representative, rather than the patient, has given consent to the
DNR Order.
that the physician explained to the incapacitated patient's family members and
Representative the nature and consequences of the DNR Order.
When a patient's condition is medically futile, a DNR Order does not have to be
written if neither the patient nor Representative consented to a DNR Order.
Document the medical futility by stating in the medical record that "in the physician's
reasonable medical judgment, CPR would not prevent the imminent death of the
patient." CPR may then be withheld.
G. Transferabilityof DNR Orders
Possibly the most beneficial provision of the Oklahoma Do-Not-Resusitate Act
permits DNR Orders or consents to remain in effect when a patient is transferred
from one health care facility to another. 57 A DNR Order or consent also remains
effective if a patient with either document in his medical record is admitted to a health
care facility from his home.58 This is particularly useful for health care providers
when a nursing home resident with a DNR Order is transferred to a hospital and is
no longer capable of communicating his wishes concerning CPR. The hospital may
honor the DNR Order or consent which was in place at the nursing home without
obtaining a new Order from the physician or new consent from the patient.
Health care providers need to become familiar with the latest amendments to the
Act and its effect on their current DNR policies and Patient Self-Determination Act
procedures.5 9 Physicians should be encouraged to talk with their patients while they
are capable of discussing their wishes concerning CPR. Patients may want to update
their Advance Directives for Health Care to include specific directions concerning
DNR Orders. Finally, transfer policies should be updated to include a requirement
that any DNR Order in place at a transferring facility will be included in records sent
with the patient to any receiving facility.

II. OKLAHOMA AND FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING PAIN CONTROL MEDICATIONS AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

A. Relevant Supreme Court Decisions
Individuals have become increasingly interested in directing their own medical

57. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3131.10 (West Supp. 2000).

58. Id.
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (1999).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999

13

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 35 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 6

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:565

decisions.6" This is especially so since the United States Supreme Court issued its
ground-breaking decision in Cruzanv. Director,MissouriDepartmentof Health.61
In Cruzan, the court permitted but does not require states to insist on proof of the
patient's actual intent, but also that it does not require, a clear and convincing
evidentiary standard of proof before life support may be terminated.6 2
In Washington v. Glucksberg63 and Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court
turned down an opportunity to extend the liberty interest recognized in Cruzan to
permit terminally ill patients to recognize the "time and manner" of their death by
foregoing life-sustaining treatment and also seeking the assistance from their

physician to provide a lethal dose of medication. In Glucksberg, a state law
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients was stricken in an en
banc decision by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. In Vacco, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals more recently held that a New York statute prohibiting physicianassisted suicide violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
In reviewing both circuit decisions on appeal in 1997, the United States

Supreme Court specifically permitted states the right to determine whether to prohibit
physician-assisted suicide, reversing the Second Circuit's finding of constitutional

protection for terminally ill patients seeking the end of their lives with their
physician's help.65 Oklahoma exercised its legislative prerogative to prohibit
physician-assisted suicide the following year enacting the Oklahoma Assisted Suicide
Prevention Act.
B. The Oklahoma Assisted Suicide PreventionAct
The Oklahoma Assisted Suicide Prevention Act is designed to protect
"vulnerable persons" from suicide by providing specific preventative civil remedies.66

60. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Decisions to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment, 283 JAMA 1065
(2000)(discussing the general framework for decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment as well as practical ethical
condsiderations); see generallyJill A. Rhymes et al., Withdrawing Very Low- Burden Interventionsin Chronically
Ill Patients,283 JAMA 1061 (2000) (addressing the distinctive ethical issues that arise when the physician considers
withdrawing low-burden clinical management from chronically-but no critically ill patients).
61. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
62. SeeMNIsElsupranote2, at41-49 (discussing ofthe Cruzan decisionanditsimplicationsinsignificantdepth);
Ronald E. Cranford, A Hostageto Technology,HASTNS CEim REP., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 8; see generallyJoanne
Lynn and Jacqueline Glover, Cruzan and Caringfor Others,HASTNGS CEq
REP., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 10 (written
by physicians, exploring the effect of the case on the doctor/patient relationships).
63. Glucksberg v. Washington, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
64. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
65. Glucksberg v. Washington, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997). See L. Gostin,
DecidingLife andDeathin the Courtroom:From Quinlan to Cruzan,Glucksberg,and Vacco-A BriefHistoryand
Analysis of Constitutional Protection of the 'Right-to Die', 278 JAMA 1523 (1997); T. Rillo, Comment,
ConsitutionalLaw: The Limits of a Patient'sRight to Refuse Medical Treatment,46 FLA. L. REV. 347 (1994). See
generally P. Rizzo, Religion-BasedArguments in the Public Arena: A Catholic Prospective on Euthanasia,
Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington and Quill v. Vacco, 1 DEPAuLJ. HEALTH CARE 243 (1996).
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3141.1 (West Supp. 2000).
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An injunction can be sought to preempt an expected act of attempted suicide.67 In
addition, if one proves a violation of the Act, both compensatory and punitive
damages may be awarded.6"
The Oklahoma Assisted Suicide Prevention Act also contains certain protections
for health care professionals who prescribe or administer high levels of pain
medications without any intent to cause the patient's death.69 Protected professionals
include physicians, nurses, dentists, podiatrists, physician assistants and
pharmacists." Such professionals who provide pain medication solely in an effort to
relieve pain, even if the medication increases the risk of death, will not be in violation
71
of the law.
The Assisted Suicide Prevention Act has been in effect since November 1,
1998.72 To date, there are no reported cases construing the Act. " The primary
effect of theseprovisions may be to encourage physicians to provide appropriate pain
management for their patients without fear of prosecution under the criminal statutes
prohibiting assisted suicide.74
The Oklahoma Assisted Suicide Prevention Act has provided greater certainty
to physicians who attempt to control severe pain in their terminally ill patients. So
long as the physician's goal is to provide pain control, there should be no criminal or
civil liability associated with the prescription or administration of pain medication.7 5
Patients who are able to obtain some assurance of adequate pain relief may be less
likely to request assistance in ending their lives. Both patients and health care
professionals need increased awareness of this new law so its benefits can be fully
realized.
C. The FederalAssisted Suicide Funding RestrictionAct
On April 30, 1997, President Clinton signed The Assisted Suicide Funding
Restriction Act of 1997.76 This law prohibits federal health care programs from
reimbursing any costs associated with assisted suicide.77 This may be only "window
dressing" because it is unlikely a provider would submit a bill for an overt act of
assisted suicide. So long as state law is followed with regard to pain medication use,

67. See id. § 3141.5 (West Supp. 2000).
68. See id. § 3141.6 (West Supp. 2000).
69. See id. § 3141.4 (West Supp. 2000).
70. See id. § 3141.2(1) (West Supp. 2000).
71. Ohm&- STAT. tit. 63, § 3141.4 (West Supp. 2000). See State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211 (Kan. Ct.App. 1998)
("palliative care refers to medical intervention in which the primary purpose is to alleviate pain and suffering"); Mina
L. Levin et al., Management of Pain in Terminally Ill Patients:PhysicianReports of Knowledge, Attitudes, and
Behavior, 15 J. PAIN&SYmPToMMG fr. 27 (1998); Orentlicher, Legalizationof PhysicianAssisted Suicide:A Very
Modest Revolution, 38 BOSTON C. L. REV. 8 (1997) ("greater use of palliative care would reduce the demand for
assisted suicide, but would not eliminate it").
72. OK.A STAT. tit.63, § 3141 (West Supp. 2000).
73. Legal antecedents to the Oklahoma right to die legislation include the following two appellate reported cases:
Edinburgh v. State, 896 P.2d 1176 (Okla. Crim App. 1995) and Sparks v. I-Icks, 912 P.2d 331 (Okla. 1996).
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3141.1 (vest Supp. 2000) (describing the legislative intent).
75. OLA.STAT. tit. 63, § 3141.4(A).
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14401 (1999).
77. Il
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the issue is unlikely to arise. This is particularly true so long as Medicare does not
cover prescription medications. This federal law also includes funding for a suicide
prevention program aimed at reducing suicide among the terminally ill and disabled
populations and to further effective palliative care for these individuals.
IV. DURABLE POWERS OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE
One of the most useful tools for health care decision-making is the Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care.7 8 A person who wishes to appoint another person
to make health care decisions for him or her in the event of future incapacity may do
so instead of or in addition to a living will." Health care providers may rely on
patient's Advance Directive only after two physicians agree that the patient is
terminally ill or persistently unconscious. There are many circumstances in which an
individual may no longer be capable of making decisions but not be terminally ill or
persistently unconscious.8" In those cases, the physician cannot rely on the patient's
instructions in the living will, or on a Health Care Proxy's direction unless the
incapacitated patient signed a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, no one is
legally able to make medical decisions for the patient until a guardian of the person
is appointed by a court. In order to avoid this expensive and time-consuming legal
proceeding, every one should consider signing a Durable Power of Attorney for
81
Health Care.
A Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care must include certain language
and specifications to be legally binding. The document must contain
language that makes it "endure" past the time the individual signing it becomes
incompetent. The document must also state that the power of attorney "is intended
as a durable power of attorney given under the provisions of Uniform Durable Power
of Attorney Act and shall not be affected by my subsequent disability or incapacity
or lapse of time." In addition, the document must specify that the holder named in the
document, known as the "attorney in fact" is given the right to make health care
decisions. Unlike the Advance Directive, the Durable Power of Attorney for Health
Care must be signed before a Notary Public as well as two witnesses.
To reduce the possibility of conflict or confusions, it is a good practice to name
the same individual identified as a Health Care Proxy in one's Advance Directive as
the attorney in fact in one's Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care. Impor-

78. See FURROW, supra note 1, at 258-261 (setting forth the historical path of durable powers of attorney in the
health care setting). Id. at 261 ("legal significance of a durable power of attorney for health care is defined by each
state's durable power of attorney statute"). See generallyDavid A. Peters, Advance MedicalDirectives:the Casefor
the DurablePower ofAttorneyforHealth Care,8 J.LEGALMED. 437 (1987); Susan R. Martyn and Lynn Balshone
Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for theTerminallylfl:The Living will and Durable Power ofAttorney. 63 N ma
L. REv.779 (1984); Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 CoLMBuIA L. REV. 985
(1984).
79. MaEisE., supranote 2, at 12.
80. See Roth, supra note 3, at 279.
81. See FURROW, supra note 1, at 260 (asserting that in drafting durable powers of attorney under state statutes
which permit deviation from statutory form, it makes sense to be expansive and properly directive).
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581

tantly, an attorney in fact cannot make decisions regarding the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment or artificial nutrition and hydration unless that
person is also named as the individual's Health Care Proxy in an Advance Directive.
Therefore, most individuals are best protected by signing both an Advance Directive
and a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care.
V. CONCLUSION

Unless one experiences an untimely accidental death, the need for end of life
decision-making is inevitable. Whether an individual makes these decisions himself
or the decision is ultimately forced on him by the vagaries of state law, the decisions
will be made. For those with foresight, decision-making can be made in advance
through a combination of state-sanctioned documents, thereby ensuring that health
care decisions are made based on the individual's purposeful choices and not by fiat.
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